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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this paper is to uncover the effects of background characteristics
on members of Congress’ legislative activity. I intend to measure legislative activity
using the total number of bills sponsored and cosponsored during each Congress.
Beginning in 1973, this original dataset includes over 6,000 observations and is the most
comprehensive study of this subject. Because my dataset begins in 1973, I will be able to
identify any effect that the unrestricted ability to cosponsor, which began in 1978, had on
legislative activeness. It is my intention to contribute to our scholarly understanding of
sponsorship and cosponsorship activity in the U.S. House of Representatives and help
shape future studies. I find empirical support for the signaling perspective which posits
that political actors use legislative activity as a means for internal, rather than external,
communication.

vi

INTRODUCTION
Background
For many members of the U.S. House of Representatives, the long and exhaustive
electoral process has become the climax of their careers, as well as one of the most
studied areas in our discipline. While elections are obviously worthy of research, it is
important to have a better understanding of what makes our elected representative not
only a member, but also an active one. Are there similarities in the backgrounds of
members of Congress that give them an advantage (or even a disadvantage) over others?
For example, does a member of the U.S. House of Representatives benefit from political
knowledge gained prior to taking that office? How does one quantitatively estimate such
a relationship? Finding relationships that may help indicate legislator’s productivity prior
to their taking the seat would benefit not only the constituents who rely on these officials
to speak for their interests, but the political parties as well.
The acts of sponsorship and cosponsorship at first glance seem straightforward.
Members of Congress can either agree with a piece of legislation and formally support it
by signing their name, or they can refrain from doing so, regardless of their personal
preferences. This begs the question—what motivates one member of Congress to sponsor
and cosponsor several more pieces of legislation than another member? I hypothesize that
there is a link between individual members’ background characteristics and their level of
activity as a Representative. In this paper, I expect to find a positive relationship between
formal and informal education, on one hand, and increased legislative activity, as
measured by cosponsorship and sponsorship on the other. Additionally, higher levels of
seniority are expected to have a positive effect on legislative activity, according to the
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signaling theory. I intend to examine these acts in the 93rd (1973-1974) through the 107th
(2001-2002) Congresses of the U.S. House of Representatives.
Studying Legislative Careers
There is much to be learned from studying the careers of political actors. Hibbing
(1999, 149) writes that, “for many scholars, a major reason to study legislative careers is
to understand the motivation of legislators and humans more generally.” Although there
has almost always been a desire to understand general human behavior, political
scientists have failed thus far at conducting far-reaching studies which focus on
increasing comprehensive knowledge of political actors.
It is necessary to study the career paths of legislators in order to advance our
understanding of the political mind. In my opinion, many political actors consciously
follow a traditional path to public office. This path could include holding lower-level
positions, such as state senators or mayors, or working as a legislative aide in order to
gain knowledge of the political system’s norms and traditions.
This study focuses on the backgrounds of legislators and how certain background
characteristics may be related to their level of activity once elected to the U.S. House of
Representatives. I measure activity as the total number of bills sponsored and
cosponsored by each House member in a given 2-year congressional session. While
previous studies have limited their examination to only one or two Congresses, I have
collected data on the 93rd through 107th Congresses. This allows me to identify patterns of
behavior and reach more general conclusions about the impact of legislators’
backgrounds on their performance as a member of Congress. Additionally, previous
studies of sponsorship and cosponsorship often limit their scope to a specific piece of
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legislation or categories of bills, such as gender related bills (Swers, 2005; Swers, 1998).
These types of studies are interesting, yet lack the general foundation necessary to
advance general understanding of Congressional activity.
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REVIEW OF LITERATURE
Historical Overview
According to Sachs (1998), a member of Congress who introduces a piece of
legislation is known as its sponsor. “In a strictly formal sense, sponsorship of a bill only
identifies the Representative who introduces it, and does not necessarily indicate support.
A Member may, for example, introduce a bill as a courtesy, such as legislation proposed
by the President. Cosponsors, on the other hand, commonly add their names to a bill to
indicate support” (Sachs 1998, 2). Sponsorship is the real hard work of originating
legislation. Sponsors are expected to oversee the writing of legislation, a task which
typically becomes the responsibility of their staff. Further more, if they are serious about
a bill, sponsors are expected to shepherd the bill through the legislative process.
Cosponsorship, on the other hand, does not imply the same level of commitment (Burke
and Garand, 2005).
Since 1978, members of the U.S. House of Representatives and the Senate have
had the unrestricted ability to cosponsor any desired piece of legislation (Campbell,
1982). In recent years there has been an increase in the scholarly writing on this topic.
There are numerous opinions regarding the desired outcome from a member’s decision to
cosponsor. Some, like Mayhew, believe that a legislators’ ultimate goal is reelection and
that, “the electoral payoff is for positions not effects” (Mayhew 1974, 132). However,
there continues to be no consensus regarding the motivations or effects of sponsorship
and cosponsorship.
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Theoretical Perspectives
In addition to the mixed findings reported in existing scholarly literature
regarding sponsorship and cosponsorship, Rothenberg and Sanders (2002) note that there
are two contrasting views to help explain the observed relationships: (1) the matching
perspective, and (2) the signaling perspective. The matching perspective posits that
legislators are rational actors and will seldom support legislation that is far from their
personal or constituency preferences. Kessler and Krehbiel (1996) connect the matching
perspective to the electoral-connection theories. This theory is based on the, “close
correspondence between legislators’ ideological predispositions (or, by extension, those
of their reelection constituencies) and the content of the legislation they choose to
cosponsor. In other words, liberals should cosponsor liberal bills, conservatives should
cosponsor conservative bills, and moderates should cosponsor moderate bills” (Kessler
and Krehbiel 1996, 555). The electoral-connection perspective also leads to the
implication that legislators with a lower electoral margin, who also tend to have less
seniority, will cosponsor in greater numbers than the more experience and electorally safe
members of Congress.
Signaling is the view that leaders in the legislature take a position in order to
transmit information to the rank and file members, thereby pressuring them to follow suit.
For clarification purposes, I align the signaling and conditional party government
theories. The conditional party government theory states that, “a unified majority party
will try to alter the inner organizational structure of a legislature to reinforce the power of
the party leader, and therefore enact priority legislation without any support from the
minority” (Aldrich, 1998). This allows for the assumption that members with more
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leadership qualities, such as party leaders, committee and subcommittee leaders, and
more senior members, will cosponsor at greater rates than freshmen.
For my purposes, I focus on the findings of Kessler and Krehbiel that “legislators
do not use bill sponsorship as a mechanism for position taking aimed primarily at
external audiences,” (pg. 563) but rather as an internal signaling device. The signaling
theory implies that higher-ranking members and leaders use sponsorship and
cosponsorship as a message to the rank and file members to join their effort. From the
signaling theory standpoint, regardless of party, a strong leader should be the most
desirable member of Congress to a voter. Therefore, the more influential a legislator is,
the number of bills sponsored and cosponsored will increase.
In the attempt to find out what makes legislators more likely to be an active
legislator, I examine the similarities in several background characteristics of the members
of the 93rd (1973-1974) through the 107th (2001-2002) Congresses of the U.S. House of
Representatives. This is the largest and most comprehensive dataset on this subject.
It is likely that highly active legislators may be capable of influencing their peers’
decisions. Therefore when a member of Congress becomes well respected, electorally
safe, and presumably productive, the acts of sponsorship and cosponsorship theoretically
signals freshmen, and less influential or prominent members, to support the specific piece
of legislation.
To date, there has been relatively little literature written on sponsorship and
cosponsorship or the factors that may lead a member of Congress to support a piece of
legislation. Much of the existing scholarly work is focused on varying aspects of
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sponsorship and cosponsorship. From my literature review, I found that there are
basically 5 categories of hypotheses that have been studied thus far:1
The hypothesis that sponsorship is related to legislative expertise and personal
preferences is an informational and normative one. It coincides with the idea that
committees are designed to provide the members of congress with comprehensive,
unbiased information to aid in their decision-making. This hypothesis, studied by
Gilligan and Krehbiel (1995), found a positive relationship between cosponsorship and
legislative expertise. However, Gilligan and Krehbiel studied only the House Energy and
Commerce Committee. In Krehbiel (1995), the members’ preferences were found to be
the most strongly related factor in their cosponsoring decisions.
There is the notion that cosponsorship in both the House and the Senate is
somehow related to ideology, partisanship, and the electoral margin. The affects that
these factors contribute to cosponsorship vary. Campbell (1982) found a “positive
relationship between liberalism and cosponsorship and a negative relationship between
electoral margin and cosponsorship.” Krehbiel (1995) found that cosponsorship was
affected only minimally by partisanship.
Browne (1985) found a relationship between the act of sponsorship and
cosponsorship and the success of the piece of legislation. That is that the more a bill
appeared to be potentially successful, the more support it gained in the form of
cosponsorship. Young and Wilson (1993) incorporated expertise and ideology with the
bandwagon effect only to produce mixed results. The bandwagon effect is closely related
to the signaling perspective. I distinguish between the two based on my perceived

1

Note that these hypotheses are the result of constricted data; normally the sample size only includes one
or two Congresses.
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differences in the rank and file member’s motivations. This assumes that the bandwagon
effect is in place when a legislator is motivated to cosponsor after noticing the bills’
probability for final passage. The idea of the bandwagon effect is that a member does not
want to miss the opportunity to be attached to popular and successful policy. It is the
basic concept that people have a desire to win. In other areas of political science, a
similar idea is attached to the variation between actual and self-reported voting.
The signaling theory is different from the above hypothesis in that the decision to
cosponsor comes after a cue is received from a leader by a rank and file member. Related
to this hypothesis is the work of Kessler and Krehbiel (1996), which examines the timing
of a legislator’s decision to cosponsor.2 Kessler and Krehbiel assume that the signal is
being received internally, influencing the members of Congress, rather than externally,
External signaling would indicate that legislators are getting the majority of their cues
from their constituents.
The widely cited book by David Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection
(1974) laid the foundation for current studies of the motivations of legislators. Mayhew
states that legislators are, “single-minded seekers of reelection, see what kinds of activity
that goal implies, and then speculate about how congressmen so motivated are likely to
go about building and sustaining legislative institutions and making policy” (pg. 5-6). I
agree with Aldrich and Rohde that Mayhew’s approach “would [not] provide a complete
accounting of congressional behavior, but [is] sufficient to explain most that was of
interest” (pg. 269). Many authors have argued that the desire to be reelected takes priority
over the need to create good public policy. In the context of sponsorship and
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Also see Hall (1997) for a discussion of the political-business cycle which evaluates the timing of
elections and actions of strategic political actors.
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cosponsorship, the reelection theory would view these decisions as strategic and
calculated moves by a legislator attempting to appeal to his or her constituents.
The literature currently available to the political science community on
cosponsorship is still developing. The variation in the literature suggests that the area is
complicated and that it may be more difficult to reach comprehensive conclusions. Much
of the research cited above comes from studies at the individual level of analysis
(meaning that they focus on specific pieces of legislation rather than the total number of
bills sponsored and cosponsored). Because it is often misleading to make inferences
about the committee of the whole from a few individuals or pieces of legislation, these
findings may further complicate the ultimate goal of more comprehensive understanding.
The authors of these studies acknowledge the limits of their research and it appears that
the topic is gaining interest among scholars. The recent works of Krehbiel and others
seem to be examining the act of cosponsorship more fully and are reaching more definite
conclusions than their predecessors.
Instead of approaching the problem of understanding a member’s decision to
cosponsor with one hypothesis, I intend to look at the big picture. Legislative activity,
measured by the total number of bills sponsored and cosponsored, may be a result of
many factors such as background characteristics, cues from leaders, ideology,
partisanship, etc. By identifying and/or eliminating some key influences on members’
productivity, and by contributing to the theoretical basis of this area of work, scholarly
research may be more guided in the future.
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DATA AND METHODOLOGY
Dependent Variables: Sponsorship and Cosponsorship
In order to examine the phenomena of active and less active Representatives, I use
data on bill sponsorship and cosponsorship. Much of the previous research on this topic
was primarily based on specific and often controversial pieces of legislation. Since my
objective is not to uncover the motivations, likelihood, or probability of support for an
individual bill, but rather the similarities in the legislators themselves, I propose to utilize
the aggregate data I have collected in order to estimate negative binomial regression
analyses on various models. Using data at the aggregate level, as opposed to the
individual level, allows me to see the big picture and ultimately make more
comprehensive generalizations about productivity as opposed to statements regarding
specific pieces of legislation and/or issues.
To investigate the suspected relationship between the background characteristics
of members of Congress and productivity, I collected data from various sources on over
6,400 Representatives during the 93rd- 107th Congresses. I collected the majority of my
biographical information from various volumes of the Almanac of American Politics.
Data for the dependent variables were obtained from the Library of Congress website.
When there were discrepancies, some additional information came from members’
homepages. Measures of ideology (Poole and Rosenthal, 2005), and congressional
district data (Adler, 2003) were merged into my dataset.3 Finally, the data were pooled in
order to identify relationships over time.

3

Refer to Appendix for detailed descriptions of all variables.
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Negative Binomial Regression
The dataset used for this study is a pooled cross-sectional time series. The data are
a collection of variables over time as well as for single Congresses. This allows for
statistical analysis of the 15 Congresses as a whole and individually. Autocorrelation, the
correlation of errors over time, and systematic errors are often problems associated with
this type of data. By estimating a pooled negative binomial regression model, I can
account for the systematic variation across individual members of Congress, as well as
over time. Because my dependent variables—the total number of bills sponsored and
cosponsored—are best described as events count data, ordinary least squares (OLS)
regression is an inappropriate method. A Poisson model is also an ineffective tool since
Poisson regression assumes equal dispersion of the dependent variables.4 As a result, I
have employed a statistical method better suited than more traditional methods for event
count data known as negative binomial regression. Negative binomial regression is also
suitable for data, such as mine, which demonstrates overdispersion within the dependent
variables.
Independent Variables and Hypotheses
For statistical analyses, I have separated my dependent variables into separate
sponsorship and cosponsorship models. For each legislator, I entered the total number of
bills that were sponsored or cosponsored during that particular Congress. To test each of
the following hypotheses, I have grouped those independent variables that I expect to
have a relationship on the measures of legislative activity to create four models: (1)
Socialization, (2) Leadership, (3) Preferences, and (4) Full Model.
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Refer to following Results and Discussion section for graphical illustrations of the overdispersion of the
dependent variables.

11

Modeling the Effects of Socialization on Legislative Activity
Socialization, including formal and informal education, is expected to have a
positive relationship with the dependent variables. I test this hypothesis using the
following independent measures of political education and experience: (1) whether the
House member is an attorney, (2) whether the House member served in the U.S. military;
(3) whether the member held elected office at the state or local level, including mayors or
city councilmembers, but excluding judges; (4) whether the member was formerly a
member of the state legislature; and (5) whether the House member was a staff member
for a former member of the state or U.S. House or Senate. A general education model can
illustrate the relationship between various learning experiences and legislative activity.
Members with previous experience as elected officials, such as state legislators or those
who held a different elected office (such as mayor), should also be more active once
elected to the U.S. House of Representatives. Attorneys should be more active because of
their knowledge of the making of laws. I expect to see a positive relationship between the
dependent variables and a member having a law degree.5
As for informal education, I included biographical information from the Almanac
of American Politics to help measure learning experience gained from working as
legislative aides, staff members, and in other government jobs. My assumption here is
that like formal education, informal education will also increase the productivity level of
legislators. It is likely that working as an aide or a staffer will ultimately increase one’s
awareness and understanding of politics and the legislative branch which should increase

5

The inclusion of this variable was suggested by a personal conversation with a member of the Louisiana
House of Representatives, who contends that in order for one to create new laws, it is necessary to know
the current ones.
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legislative activity. Because a legislator is unlikely to be aware of their own legislative
socialization, it is best measured through previous work experience.
Informal education can also be attained through service in the military. I presume
that when one serves in the military a certain level of government knowledge is rapidly
acquired. Although military rank or status was not considered, I hypothesize that any
military service will be related positively to sponsorship and cosponsorship activity.
A member of Congress who has served in his or her state legislature, or in another
elected office, is expected to sponsor and cosponsor more bills. I include these variables
since it is likely that holding an elected office will familiarize one with the inner
workings of government as well as helping to form stronger opinions regarding public
policy, thereby testing the effects of informal education on legislative productivity.
Modeling the Effects of Leadership on Legislative Activity
Members of Congress who have previously demonstrated leadership qualities are
expected to sponsor and cosponsor more legislation. To examine the leadership
hypothesis, I grouped the variables in my dataset relating to leadership; (1) committee
chair status; (2) subcommittee chair status; (3) party leader status; (4) seniority; and (5)
gender. The reasons I included these variables are quite simple. In accordance with the
signaling theory, the most active members are also likely to be committee, subcommittee,
or party leaders. The members who hold these positions are expected to be the ones
responsible for sending the cues to rank and file legislators, regardless of which party is
in the majority. There is variance in existing literature as to how these cues are delivered
to rank and file members.6 Legislators who hold leadership positions are typically
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Visible leaders could potentially use the media as a sophisticated communication device; they not only
alert the lower ranking members, but their constituents as well.
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members with seniority status. Since women have only recently begun serving in the
legislature, these leaders are more often men. Therefore, in line with the signaling and
conditional party government perspectives, I hypothesize that party leaders, committee,
and subcommittee leaders will exhibit increased levels of legislative activity.
Modeling the Effects of Preferences on Legislative Activity
The preferences hypothesis incorporates the ideas that extremism, low electoral
margin, and constituency characteristics may contribute to increased productivity. This
model includes the variables that do not clearly fit into the leadership or education
models: (1) ideological conservatism; (2) ideological extremism; (3) party affiliation; (4)
median income in member’s districts; and (5) electoral margin. First, using Adler’s data
on congressional districts, I include measures of district median income. The variable is
used as an attempt to measure political activism and engagement on the part of House
members’ constituencies. I speculate that congressional districts with a higher median
income will elect more active Representatives, so median income should be positively
related to sponsorship and cosponsorship activity. Related to the electoral-connection
theory is the idea that freshmen members, often elected in close races, are more likely to
have an increased number of sponsored and cosponsored bills in order to appeal to their
constituents during reelection. These freshmen legislators with small electoral margins
are also likely to be representing competitive districts. Sponsoring and cosponsoring
more legislation, especially distributive bills, is expected to be helpful in their reelection
campaigns. Specifically, this group of legislators is expected to be more active in order to
facilitate their own reelection.7

7

Refer to earlier discussion of Mayhew (1974).
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Poole and Rosenthal’s DW-Nominate scores measure legislators’ ideological
conservatism. I speculate, holding all other variables constant, that more conservative
legislators will sponsor and cosponsor less than their liberal peers because these members
are more likely to promote the limited role of government point of view. The folded
Poole and Rosenthal score is a measure included to capture ideological extremism on
both sides of the spectrum. Since members with extreme ideological beliefs are likely to
sponsor and cosponsor before many of their moderate peers, I expect to see a positive
relationship between legislators with extreme ideological positions and the dependent
variables.
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
What explains patterns of sponsorship and cosponsorship activity in the U.S.
House of Representatives? In Table 1, I provide an overview of the statistical analyses.
These tables indicate negative binomial regression coefficients for the combined 15
Congresses. This allows for comparisons of sponsorship and cosponsorship activity, as
well as observing trends over time.
I have provided some basic descriptive information about the dependent variables.
In Figures 1 and 2, I show the distribution of bills for both sponsorship and cosponsorship
with a box plot. Beginning in 1978, during the 95th Congress, legislators gained the
unrestricted ability to cosponsor legislation. This change is notable in the 96th Congress,
1979-1980.
The pattern of sponsorship, shown in Figure 1, illustrates the gradual decline in
activity over time. Clearly, the changes which occurred in 1978 had a tangible impact on
sponsorship and cosponsorship activity. In the 93rd Congress (1973-1974), the mean
number of bills sponsored is 47.8, with a standard deviation of 39.26. In the 107th
Congress (2001-2002), the mean of sponsored bills fell to just 17.16, with a standard
deviation of 13.08.
Meanwhile, Figure 2 shows cosponsorship activity in the early years of this
dataset results in a mean of 103.09 pieces of legislation and a standard deviation of
104.05. In the most recent Congress studied, the 107th (2001-2002), the mean for
cosponsorship activity rose to 276.05 with a standard deviation of 148.57. Notice how in
Figure 2 the pattern of cosponsorship increases dramatically around the same time as the
ability to freely cosponsor came about. This indicates that the act of cosponsorship can be
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considered less costly to a member of Congress than sponsorship. Cosponsoring
legislation is the formal acknowledgement of support, as opposed to sponsorship which
includes drafting and managing a piece of legislation. The much more time-consuming
task of sponsorship appears to be on the decline. The mean number of bills sponsored is
24.2, with a standard deviation of 24.3. The mean number of bills cosponsored, however,
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Figure 1. Total number of bills sponsored, full model of sponsorship behavior, U.S.
House of Representatives, 1973-1974 (93rd Congress) to 2001-2002 (107th Congress).
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Figure 2. Total number of bills cosponsored, full model of cosponsorship behavior,
U.S. House of Representatives, 1973-1974 (93rd Congress) to 2001-2002 (107th
Congress).

Figure 3 illustrates the frequency of sponsored legislation for each of the 15
Congresses studied. Notice the jump in activity, especially during the 96th Congress.
Recall that the 96th Congress marks the beginning of the unrestricted ability to cosponsor
which was enacted just one year prior; this pattern is maintained throughout the sample.
Comparatively, Figure 4 represents patterns of cosponsorship activity in the U.S.
House of Representatives, 1973-2002. Unlike sponsorship, this illustration shows little
variation in legislative activity. In the 96th Congress there was a sharp increase in
sponsorship activity. However, it appears not to be the case for cosponsorship. One can
see the slight increase in activity, but it is not as extreme as was seen in Figure 3.
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Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the patterns of sponsorship and cosponsorship activity
over the time period studied, 1973-2002. It is noticeable that the changes which took
place around the 96th Congress significantly affected legislative activity. These figures
also show the dependent variables are consistently skewed sharply to the right which
further illustrates the need for the negative binomial regression method.
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Figure 3. Graphic representation of total number of bills sponsored during each
Congress, 1973-2002.
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Figure 4. Graphic representation of total number of bills cosponsored during each
Congress, 1973-2002.
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Table 1. Negative binomial regression results, full models of sponsorship and
cosponsorship behavior, U.S. House of Representatives, 1973-1974 (93rd Congress)
to 2001-2002 (107th Congress).
Sponsorship
b

Cosponsorship

Z

b

Z

0.096
0.209

1.50*
2.88***

0.139
0.137

3.05***
2.71***

-0.339
0.379

-3.46***
3.03***

-0.579
0.438

-9.51***
5.99***

0.013
0.027
0.067
-0.027
0.114
0.016

0.38
0.78
1.90**
-0.92
3.67***
6.74***

-0.042
-0.015
-0.057
0.073
0.071
-0.010

-1.80*
-0.63
-2.20**
3.53***
3.20***
-6.19***

0.006
0.142
0.133

0.16
3.15***
5.11***

-0.025
0.025
0.074

-0.82
0.83
4.56***

-0.000005
0.004

-3.44***
5.24***

-0.000003
0.0012

-3.41***
2.56***

Member characteristics
Gender [+]
Party [-]
Spatial variables
DW-Nominate [-]
Folded DW-Nominate [+]
Legislative experience
Attorney [+]
Mentored [+]
Military [+]
State legislator [+]
State or local elected official [+]
Seniority [+]
Institutional position
Party leader [+]
Committee chair [+]
Subcommittee chair [+]
Constituent Pressure
Median income [+]
Election margin [+]
Legislative context
Cosponsorship reform (post-1978)
N
Pseudo-R2
Model Chi-square
Prob (Chi-square)

-0.692

-18.87

[+] 0.535

6483

6483

1026.50
0.0000

1187.33
0.0000
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23.24***

Sponsorship Results
The signaling perspective posits that leaders use legislative activity to motivate or
inform the rank and file members. This model finds support for the signaling hypothesis
because seniority, committee chair status, and subcommittee chair status can be viewed
as positions of leadership within the legislature. As hypothesized, leadership variables
have a positive and statistically significant relationship to sponsorship. Seniority has a
strong relationship (b = 0.016, Z = 6.74) to sponsorship activity. This indicates that more
experienced members of Congress are sponsoring more legislation than freshmen
members. Serving as a committee chair also has a positive impact on sponsorship activity
(b = 0.142, Z = 3.15), as seen in Table 1. Also, subcommittee chair status also has a
positive relationship to sponsorship activity (b = 0.133, Z = 5.11). However, the variable
measuring party leadership has little effect on the sponsorship of legislation (b = 0.006, Z
= 0.16). Together, the leadership variables indicate support for the signaling perspective.
The socialization of legislators, on the other hand, likely occurs once the member
has been elected to the U.S. House of Representatives. Variables indicating previous
education and socialization are seen to have little impact on sponsorship activity. There
is, however, a connection between legislators with local political experience and their
sponsorship activity. Many of the variables representing the socialization hypothesis did
not have statistically significant coefficients. Neither legal education, service with the
military, working as a legislative aide, nor holding state legislative positions significantly
affects legislative activity in the U.S. House of Representatives. However, serving as a
state or local official does have a statistically significant relationship to legislative
activity in the hypothesized direction. These political actors may feel more obligated to
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bring distributive legislation to their constituents. The variable has a strong coefficient (b
= 0.114, Z = 3.67) which indicates the need for additional research of this relationship.
There is also a modest relationship between gender and sponsorship behavior. The
effect of gender is especially interesting because it indicates that women are sponsoring
legislation at a higher rate than their male counterparts (b = 0.096, Z = 1.50). Existing
literature using data at the state level (Bratton and Haynie, 1999) finds support to the
contrary. Additional research on this variable could help clarify the observed relationship
between gender and sponsorship activity.
Personal preferences—including scores of ideological extremism, partisanship,
and electoral margin—also indicate a statistically significant relationship in the
hypothesized direction. Ideological extremism was expected to have a positive
relationship with legislative activity. This model indicates a statistically significant
coefficient (b = 0.379, Z = 3.03) in the hypothesized direction. DW-Nominate scores,
however, resulted in a relationship that is in the opposite direction (b = -0.339, Z = -3.46).
The coefficient for party (b = 0.209, Z = 2.88) in Table 1 represents the effect of being a
member of the Republican party. Unexpectedly, this variable produced a statistically
significant coefficient in the positive direction. This indicates that Republican members
are actually sponsoring more legislation than their Democratic peers.
Cosponsorship Results
Cosponsorship behavior is particularly interesting in this study because I had the
unprecedented opportunity to observe changes in this activity over time. As mentioned
earlier in this paper, in 1978 members of Congress gained the unrestricted ability to
cosponsor legislation. Figure 2 illustrates the apparent, and steady, increase in
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cosponsorship activity through the late 1970’s and 1980’s. Cosponsorship activity peaked
during the 101st Congress (1989-1990) when members averaged 375.4 pieces of
legislation. During the Republican-controlled Congress of 1994, levels of cosponsorship
activity returned to their pre-1978 state.
In Tables 2 and 3, I show the top ten sponsors and cosponsors of legislation for
the combined 15 Congresses. These members noticeably have one common denominator;
they are mostly members of the Democratic party.

Table 2. List of the top ten most active legislators, full model of sponsorship
behavior, U.S. House of Representatives, 1973-1974 (93rd Congress) to 2001-2002
(107th Congress).

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Congress
95
94
95
93
94
95
94
93
93
93

Name
Roe
Pepper
Murphy
Roe
Koch
Pepper
Murphy
Roybal
Koch
Helstoski

State
Number of Sponsored Bills
New Jersey
325
Florida
309
New York
288
New Jersey
287
New York
283
Florida
277
New York
250
California
242
New York
225
New Jersey
218

Table 3. List of the top ten most active legislators, full model of cosponsorship
behavior, U.S. House of Representatives, 1973-1974 (93rd Congress) to 2001-2002
(107th Congress).

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Congress
99
101
100
101
102
100
100
99
107
102

Name
Martinez
Collins
Lagomarsino
Towns
Towns
Martinez
Towns
Kaptur
Frost
Horton

State
California
Illinois
California
New York
New York
California
New York
Ohio
Texas
New York
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Number of Cosponsored Bills
1152
1141
1070
1062
1015
1011
999
986
961
959

Additionally, Figure 3 illustrates the frequency of sponsored legislation for each
of the 15 Congresses studied. Notice the jump in activity, especially during the 96th
Congress. Recall that the 96th Congress marks the beginning of the unrestricted ability to
cosponsor which was enacted just one year prior. This pattern is maintained throughout
the sample. Comparatively, Figure 4 represents patterns of cosponsorship activity in the
U.S. House of Representatives, 1973-2002. Unlike sponsorship, this illustration shows
little variation in legislative activity. In the 96th Congress there was a sharp increase in
sponsorship activity. However, it appears not to be the case for cosponsorship. One can
see the slight increase in activity, but it is not as extreme as was seen in Figure 3. While a
strong increasing pattern of cosponsorship does not appear at first glace, simple
mathematical means reveal a significant amount of activity.
The models of cosponsorship also yielded interesting findings. Unlike
sponsorship, socialization has more of an effect on cosponsorship activity. Legal
education results in a modestly significant relationship, yet in the negative direction (b = 0.042, Z = -1.80). Contrary to my original hypothesis, the acquisition of a Juris Doctorate
actually depresses the cosponsorship activity of those members. Service in the military,
as well, decreases cosponsorship activity (b = -0.057, Z = -2.20) and is also statistically
significant. As with the model of sponsorship, service as a state or local official has a
positive effect on cosponsorship behavior (b = 0.071, Z = 3.20). Work experience as an
aide or staff member neither affects sponsorship nor cosponsorship activity according to
this model.
Leadership variables were hypothesized to show the strongest relationship to the
sponsorship model. In fact, only seniority (b = -0.010, Z = -6.19) and gender (b = 0.139,
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Z = 3.05) resulted in statistically significant coefficients. Seniority, however, produced
negative coefficients meaning that the more experienced a legislator becomes, the less
he/she cosponsors. This could indicate that these members are not sending their signals
by-way of cosponsorship; rather the sponsorship model does support the notion that
senior members are communicating through the sponsorship of legislation.
The spatial variables produced exciting results for the cosponsorship model. Each
variable revealed a strong, statistically significant coefficient. Both Poole and Rosenthal
measures of ideology, party, district median income, and electoral margin have
coefficients that are significant. Having extreme political views positively relates to
cosponsorship activity (b = 0.438, Z = 5.99). The political actors who represent
ideological extremism are likely cosponsoring, as well as sponsoring, higher amounts of
legislation in the attempt to have their strong opinions heard by other members of
Congress and possibly by their constituencies. Median income was used as a surrogate
measure of the member’s district political activeness and was expected to have a positive
effect on legislative activity. This variable did not produce a relationship in the
hypothesized direction, yet it did result in a statistically significant negative one (b = 0.000003, Z = -3.41). Additionally, party (b = 0.137, Z = 2.71) should have resulted in
negative coefficients, but produced a significant positive relationship. Electorally safer
members of Congress also become more active legislators (b = 0.0012, Z = 2.56) than
their peers coming from more competitive elections. This is a very interesting
relationship which also lends support to the signaling perspective. It may be argued that
those members of Congress who were elected in close elections would sponsor and
cosponsor several bills in order to appeal to their constituencies; the theory being that
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activity brings about support and reelection. However, my results indicate that the
electorally safe legislators are more active. Therefore, these members of Congress are
likely using legislative activity in order to signal internally, rather than externally. Future
research which includes a measure of the content of these bills would be an interesting
addition to the relationship.
Finally, the effect of the unrestricted ability to cosponsor legislation resulted in a
strong statistically significant coefficient (b = 0.535, Z = 23.24). This solidifies the
observation, noticeable in Figure 2, that the changes in 1978 had a significant impact on
legislative activity. This freedom also negatively impacted sponsorship activity (b = 0.692, Z = -18.87).
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
While this study seeks to advance understanding of sponsorship and
cosponsorship activity, it also reveals several avenues for future research. I have
examined some basic hypotheses, some based on previous scholarly research, and others
which have not been thoroughly studied. Because many of my hypotheses resulted in
statistically significant correlations in the opposite direction from what I expected,
additional research and review of conventional thought is necessary.
I use data from the 93rd through 107th Congresses to empirically test
comprehensive models of sponsorship and cosponsorship. This study has revealed the
effects of a wide range of independent variables—committee and subcommittee chair
status, gender, partisan affiliation, and ideological extremism—on legislative activity.
There remains, however, a need for additional research which incorporates various
previous attempts to understand cosponsorship and sponsorship behavior.
One possibility is to integrate the idea that members of Congress are strategically
acting in order to further their personal careers in politics. Incorporating individual
members of Congress’ actions on specific pieces of legislation, while maintaining the
aggregate data, could reveal more of the underlying motivations of members to sponsor
and cosponsor legislation. Additionally, incorporating a measure of content for specified
bills could allow a researcher to see if members of Congress sponsor and cosponsor more
distributive legislation that could benefit their constituencies, which, in turn, facilitates
their own reelection. Results to the opposite effect would further strengthen my findings
here which indicate empirical support for the signaling perspective; members of Congress
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are using sponsorship and cosponsorship activity for internal signaling purposes, as
opposed to external signaling.
This study has produced some interesting and intriguing results. It has
strengthened some previously hypothesized directional relationships, such as sponsoring
and cosponsoring are used as a signaling device, while other relationships including the
socialization aspect of legislative activity were not empirically supported. The intent of
this study was to provide a generalizeble model of sponsorship and cosponsorship
activity in the U.S. House of Representatives. I feel that this project has accomplished
much of its objective. A framework of general sponsorship and cosponsorship activity
has begun with this study. Combining existing, more specific, studies and expanding the
theoretical underpinning along with this foundation are likely to yield even more
significant relationships between background characteristics and legislative activity.

29

REFERENCES
Adler, E. Scott. “Congressional District Data File, [93rd Congress to 107th Congress].”
University of Colorado, Boulder, CO. http://socsci.colorado.edu/~esadler/
districtdatawebsite/ congressionalDistrictDatasetwebpage.htm, 2003.
Aldrich, John H. and David Rohde. 1998. “Measuring Conditional Party Government.”
Available http://www.poli.duke.edu/dipe/Aldrich3.pdf
Barone, Michael, Richard E. Cohen, and Charles E. Cook, Jr. The Almanac of American
Politics. Various Years. Washington, D.C.: National Journal Group, Inc.
Bratton, Kathleen A., and Kerry L. Haynie. 1999. “Agenda Setting and Legislative
Success in State Legislatures: The Effects of Gender and Race.” The Journal of
Politics 61 (August): 658-679.
Browne, William P. 1985. “Multiple Sponsorship and Bill Success in the US State
Legislatures.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 10 (November): 485-8.
Burke, Kelly M., and James C. Garand. 2005. “Explaining Sponsorship and
Cosponsorship in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1973-2002.” paper
presented at the 2005 annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science
Association.
Campbell, James E. 1982. “Cosponsoring Legislation in the U.S. Congress.” Legislative
Studies Quarterly 7 (August): 415-22.
Gilligan, Thomas W., and Keith Krehbiel. 1995. “Specialization Decisions within
Committees.” Stanford Graduate School of Business. Typescript.
Groseclose, Tim and David C. King. “Committee Theories Reconsidered”, in Dodd and
Oppenheimer (eds.), Congress Reconsidered (7th edition).
Gravetter, Frederick J., and Larry B. Wallnau. 2000. Statistics for the Behavioral
Sciences. California: Wadsworth Thomson Learning.
Hall, Peter (1997). “The Role of Interests, Institutions, and Ideas in the Comparative
Political Economy of the Industrialized Nations.” In Mark Lichbach and Alan
Zuckerman (ed.). Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure.
Cambridge. Chapter 7.
Hibbing, John R. 1999. “Legislative Careers: Why and How We Should Study Them.”
Legislative Studies Quarterly 26 (May): 149- 171.
Kessler, Daniel and Keith Krehbiel. 1996. “Dynamics of Cosponsorship.” The American
Political Science Review 90 (September): 555-566.

30

Krehbiel, Keith. 1995. “Cosponsors and Wafflers from A to Z.” American Journal of
Political Science 39 (November): 906-923.
Lewis-Beck, Michael S. 1980. Applied Regression: An Introduction. California: SAGE
Publications, Inc.
Library of Congress, The. THOMAS Legislative Information on the Internet. Available
http://thomas.loc.gov
Mayhew, David R. 1974. Congress: The Electoral Connection. New Haven: Yale
University Press.
Patterson, Samuel C. and Gregory A. Caldeira. 1998. “Party Voting in the United States
Congress.” British Journal of Political Science 18 (January): 111-131.
Pollock, Philip H. 2003. An SPSS Companion to Political Analysis. Washington, D.C.:
CQ Press.
Poole, Keith and Howard Rosenthal, Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll Call
Voting. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997.
Poole, Keith T. and Howard Rosenthal. 1997. “DW-Nominate Scores, [93rd Congress to
107th Congress],” http://voteview.com/dwnl.htm.
Rothenberg, Lawrence S. and Michelle S. Sanders. 2002. “The Dynamics of
Cosponsorship Reconsidered,” paper presented at the 2002 annual meeting of the
American Political Science Association.
Sachs, Richard C. 1998. “Sponsorship and Cosponsorship of House Bills.” CRS
Report for Congress. Available http://www.house.gov
Sachs, Richard C. 2003. “Sponsorship and Cosponsorship of House Bills.” CRS Report
for Congress. Available http://www.house.gov
Swers, Michele L. 2005. “Connecting Descriptive and Substantive Representation: An
Analysis of Sex Differences in Cosponsorship Activity in the House of
Representatives.” Legislative Studies Quarterly (August).
Singleton, Royce A. and Bruce C. Straits. 1999. Approaches to Social Research. New
York: Oxford University Press, Inc.
Young, Cheryl D., and Rick K. Wilson. 1993. “Cosponsorship in the United States
Congress.” Rice University. Typescript.

31

APPENDIX
Variable
Sponsorship activity

Description
Number of bills sponsored by House member in
a given Congress.

Cosponsorship activity

Number of bills cosponsored by House member
in a given Congress.

Party

1 = Republican party member; 0= Democratic
party member.

DW-Nominate Scores

Scale of ideological conservatism, derived from
Poole and Rosenthal’s (1997) DW-Nominate
scores.

Folded DW-Nominate Scores

Scale of ideological intensity, computed as the
absolute value of Poole and Rosenthal’s DWNominate scores.

Attorney

1 = House member is an attorney; 0 =
otherwise.

Military

1 = House member served in the military; 0 =
otherwise.

Former congressional staffer

1 = House member served previously as
congressional staff member; 0 = otherwise.

Former state legislator

1 = House member served previously as a
member of the state legislature; 0 = otherwise.

Former state or local elected official

1 = House member is a former state or local
elected official; 0 = otherwise.

Seniority

Number of years since House member first
elected to Congress.

Party leader

1 = party leader (Speaker, majority or minority
leader, majority or minority whip); 0 =
otherwise.

Committee chair

1 = House member serves as a committee chair;
0 = otherwise.
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APPENDIX (CONTINUED)
Variable
Subcommittee chair

Description
1 = House member serves as a subcommittee
chair; 0 = otherwise.

Gender

1 = House member is female; 0 = House
member is male.

Median family income

Median family income (in dollars).

Election vote percentage

Raw percentage of the vote received by House
member in the immediately preceding election.

Cosponsorship reform (post 1978)

1 = 96th through 107th Congresses (1979-2002);
0 = 93rd through 95th Congresses (1973-1978).
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